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_____________ 
 
No. 17-2201 
_____________ 
 
AYOUBA KOMARA,  
 AKA Issouf Traore,  
 AKA Bamba Amara, 
                                   Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
                                   Respondent 
______________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
United States Department of Justice 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(BIA 1:A208-937-266) 
Immigration Judge: Hon. Daniel A. Morris 
_______________ 
 
ARGUED 
March 13, 2018 
 
Before:   JORDAN, SHWARTZ, and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: July 12, 2018) 
 _______________ 
 
Ingrid D. Johnson, Esq.   [ARGUED] 
Drinker Biddle & Reath 
105 College Road East  
Suite 300 
P.O. Box 627 
Princeton, NJ  08542 
          Counsel for Petitioner 
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Sarah A. Byrd, Esq.   
Thankful T. Vanderstar, Esq. 
Kerry A. Monaco, Esq.   [ARGUED] 
United States Department of Justice 
Office of Immigration Litigation  
P.O. Box 878 
Ben Franklin Station 
Washington, DC  20044 
          Counsel for Respondent 
_______________ 
 
OPINION∗ 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Ayouba Komara petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (“BIA”) denying his request for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief 
under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).1  We will deny the petition. 
I. Factual Background2 
Komara is a native and citizen of the Ivory Coast.  From 2005 to 2015, he resided 
in the capital city of Abidjan with his wife and five children, whom he supported through 
his work as a merchant.  He left Abidjan because he fears a gang called the Microbes, 
which consists of children ages eight and older who travel in groups of twenty or thirty, 
assaulting and killing people with firearms and machetes.  Komara says that the gang 
                                              
 ∗ This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
 
1  We thank pro bono counsel for very able representation of Komara in this 
matter. 
 
2  The background information provided here is drawn from the administrative 
record. 
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members are indiscriminate about who they attack, and they operate everywhere in the 
Ivory Coast.   
According to Komara, the Microbes are funded, controlled, and encouraged by the 
Popular Ivorian Front (“FPI”), which is the political party that held power in the Ivory 
Coast during the first decade of the 2000s.  Komara supports, and was formerly a 
member of, a rival political party, the Rally of the Republicans (“RDR”).  He was in 
charge of mobilizing members of the RDR when there was “a meeting or a concert” of 
that party.  (Admin. Rec. (“A.R.”) at 119-20.)  The FPI and the RDR competed in a 
decade-long power struggle, and, in 2010, the RDR ultimately gained governmental 
control, which it retains today.   
Komara first denounced the Microbes to the police in 2015 after they attacked and 
killed a friend of his, who was active in the RDR in Komara’s neighborhood.  After 
Komara reported the attack, police officers raided the Microbes in that neighborhood, 
which led to a shootout between the police and the Microbes that left one of the gang 
leaders dead.  Komara said that, in retaliation for reporting the Microbes to the police, a 
group of Microbes showed up at his home.  Komara was not there at the time, but his 
brother was.  The Microbes attacked his brother with machetes, and, although he 
ultimately escaped, he suffered serious injuries that required treatment at a hospital.  
Komara again reported the Microbes to the police.  He says that the police told him that 
he was being targeted by the gang.  That was when he moved his family to another part 
of the Ivory Coast.  He then went on his own to take refuge in nearby Burkina Faso for 
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one year.  He returned to the Ivory Coast for less than a day before heading to the United 
States in May 2016, with a false passport.   
When he arrived, Komara applied for admission but did not possess any valid 
admission documents.  In interviews with immigration officials, he said he fears returning 
to the Ivory Coast because the Microbes will continue to seek revenge for reporting them 
to the police.  He believes that his work as a merchant makes him more visible than 
others and so he is more vulnerable to attack.   
II. Procedural History 
Removal proceedings were initiated against Komara, and he concedes that he is 
removable under § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”).  
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I).  He applied for asylum and statutory withholding of 
removal based on persecution on account of both his membership in particular social 
groups and his political opinion.  His proposed social groups are individuals who 
denounce criminal acts performed by gangs and individuals who report crimes to the 
police.3  He also applied for relief under the CAT.   
The immigration judge (“IJ”) assigned to the case issued an oral decision denying 
Komara all relief.  The IJ found that Komara’s testimony was generally credible.  
Nevertheless, with respect to the request for asylum, the IJ concluded that Komara had 
not established past persecution nor a well-founded fear of future persecution.  The IJ 
                                              
3  Komara had also proposed before the agency a particular social group consisting 
of victims of gang violence.  He has not pursued that line of argument before us, and it is 
thus forfeited.  See In re Wettach, 811 F.3d 99, 115 (3d Cir. 2016) (treating as forfeited 
arguments not raised in an appellant’s opening brief).   
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also determined that, even if Komara had made the requisite showing as to persecution, 
he had not shown that he would have been targeted on a protected ground.  Specifically, 
he did not show that his political opinion was or would be the main reason that the 
Microbes would target him.  Moreover, he did not advance any legally cognizable 
particular social group, because his proposed groups were neither sufficiently particular 
nor socially distinct.   
Having concluded that Komara failed to satisfy the requirements for asylum, the IJ 
also concluded that Komara could not meet the higher burden of proving entitlement to 
withholding of removal.  Finally, the IJ denied Komara’s request for relief under the CAT 
because Komara had not shown a likelihood of future torture that was specific to him; his 
testimony only made general allegations of violence.   
 The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision.  It agreed that, under the current legal 
framework for defining a particular social group, Komara’s proposed groups failed to 
meet the requirements of particularity and social distinction.  Furthermore, the BIA 
agreed that Komara had not shown that his actual or imputed political opinion was why 
the Microbes targeted him.  Finally, the BIA found no clear error in the IJ’s factual 
finding that Komara had not shown it to be more likely than not that he would suffer 
abuse amounting to torture.   
 Komara timely filed the present petition for review. 
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III. Discussion4 
Komara does not challenge the BIA’s decision that he is ineligible for asylum or 
withholding of removal based on persecution on account of his actual or imputed political 
opinion, nor does he challenge the BIA’s denial of his application for relief under the 
CAT.  Therefore, those claims are forfeited.  See In re Wettach, 811 F.3d 99, 115 (3d Cir. 
2016) (treating as forfeited arguments not raised in an appellant’s opening brief).  He 
does, however, argue that we must vacate the BIA’s decision to deny his asylum and 
withholding of removal claims based on his membership in two proposed particular 
social groups.  The record does not support that conclusion and, to the contrary, dictates 
that we deny his petition for review. 
According to Komara, he is entitled to asylum because substantial evidence 
demonstrates that he suffered past persecution and that he has a well-founded fear of 
future persecution.  To be eligible for asylum, an alien must be a “refugee,” 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1158(b)(1)(A), which is defined as a person who has suffered past persecution or has a 
well-founded fear of future persecution due to his “race, religion, nationality, 
                                              
4  The BIA had jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1103 and 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(3).  
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).  “We review the BIA’s legal 
determinations de novo, subject to the principles of deference articulated in Chevron v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).”  Catwell v. Att’y Gen., 
623 F.3d 199, 205 (3d Cir. 2010).  We review factual findings under the substantial-
evidence standard.  Chavarria v. Gonzalez, 446 F.3d 508, 515 (3d Cir. 2006).  Under that 
standard, “the administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable 
adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary[.]”  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(b)(4)(B).  “Because the BIA did not summarily affirm the IJ’s order but instead 
issued a separate opinion, we review the BIA’s disposition and look to the IJ’s ruling 
only insofar as the BIA deferred to it.”  Roye v. Att’y Gen., 693 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 
2012). 
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membership in a particular social group, or political opinion[,]” Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. 
Att’y Gen., 663 F.3d 582, 590 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)).  An 
alien relying on membership in a “particular social group” as the basis for claiming 
refugee status must demonstrate that his group satisfies certain criteria to be cognizable 
under the INA.  Serrano-Alberto v. Att’y Gen., 859 F.3d 208, 219 (3d Cir. 2017). 
The IJ and the BIA both concluded that the particular social groups Komara has 
proposed fail to do so.  The BIA applied the test set forth in Matter of M-E-V-G-, 
pursuant to which an applicant has to satisfy three requirements to establish a cognizable 
particular social group: first, that the group is “composed of members who share a 
common immutable characteristic[;]” second, that the group is “defined with 
particularity,” which means it has discrete and definable boundaries that are not too 
“amorphous, overbroad, diffuse, or subjective[;]” and third, that the group is “socially 
distinct within the society in question,” which means “the people of a given society 
would perceive [the] proposed group as sufficiently separate or distinct[.]”  Matter of M-
E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 237, 239, 241 (B.I.A. 2014).  In S.E.R.L. v. Attorney 
General United States of America, we concluded that the BIA’s interpretation of 
“particular social group,” including the particularity and social distinction requirements, 
is reasonable and entitled to deference under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  ___ F.3d ___, No. 17-2031, 2018 WL 
3233796, at *10-13 (3d Cir. July 3, 2018).  Therefore, we apply the three-part test from 
M-E-V-G- to Komara’s proposed social groups.  Id. 
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Those groups fail the test because they are not socially distinct.  “Evidence such as 
country conditions reports, expert witness testimony, and press accounts of 
discriminatory laws and policies, historical animosities, and the like may establish that a 
group exists and is perceived as ‘distinct’ … in a particular society.”  Matter of M-E-V-G-
, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 244.  Komara, however, points to no evidence in the record 
supporting the assertion that “individuals who denounce criminal acts performed by gang 
members” and “individuals who report crimes to the police” are perceived as distinct 
groups by citizens of the Ivory Coast.  (Opening Br. at 18.) 
The 2015 Department of State country report for the Ivory Coast does not identify 
any mistreatment of individuals who oppose criminal activity or who report crimes to the 
police.  No expert testimony was proffered.  And the only press accounts in the record 
suggest that the Ivory Coast’s population as a whole is frustrated with the criminal and 
gang violence taking place in the country, which indicates that Ivory Coast society would 
not recognize Komara’s proposed groups as socially distinct from others.  Moreover, 
there is no evidence of historical animosity in the Ivory Coast against people who oppose 
gangs or who report crimes to the police. 
Nor is there anything distinct, it seems, about those who oppose the Microbes 
specifically.  The Microbes themselves do not appear to pay attention to that.  Komara 
stated that they are indiscriminate in their hostility – “They assault everybody.”  (A.R. at 
141.)  Even if Komara could argue that the Microbes perceive as distinct the people who 
denounce their activities and report them to the police, a persecutor’s subjective 
perception is legally insufficient to demonstrate social distinction.  See Matter of M-E-V-
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G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 242 (clarifying that recognition of a particular social group “is 
determined by the perception of the society in question, rather than by the perception of 
the persecutor”). 
Because Komara’s proposed social groups lack social distinction, it is unnecessary 
to determine whether those groups are sufficiently particular.  In sum, we agree with the 
BIA’s conclusion that Komara has not demonstrated that his proposed particular social 
groups are legally cognizable under the INA, and his asylum application was properly 
denied.5 
 Turning to Komara’s withholding of removal claim, because he cannot meet the 
standard for asylum, it necessarily follows that he cannot meet the more stringent 
standard for withholding of removal.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (“[T]he Attorney 
General may not remove an alien to a country if the Attorney General decides that the 
alien’s life or freedom would be threatened in that country because of the alien’s … 
membership in a particular social group[.]”); Valdiviezo-Galdamez, 663 F.3d at 591 (“To 
qualify for withholding of removal [under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)], an alien must establish 
a ‘clear probability of persecution,’ i.e., that it is more likely than not, that s/he would 
suffer persecution upon returning home.” (citation omitted)). 
IV. Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny Komara’s petition for review. 
                                              
5  Because Komara has not demonstrated persecution based on a protected ground, 
his remaining arguments are moot. 
